

**Preliminary Report on the Serious Incident involving a Boeing 737-700 aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-MJF operated by Arik Air Limited, which occurred during climb out of FL 260 for FL 290 en-route Obafemi Jeremiah Awolowo International Airport (DNPO), Port Harcourt on 11 February, 2026.**

<b>Operator:</b>	Arik Air Limited
<b>Type and model:</b>	Boeing 737-700
<b>Manufacturer:</b>	The Boeing Aircraft Company, USA
<b>Year of manufacture:</b>	2007
<b>Nationality and registration marks:</b>	5N-MJF
<b>Serial number:</b>	34762
<b>Location:</b>	En-route Port Harcourt
<b>Date and Time:</b>	11 February, 2026 at about 07:35 h

(All times in this report are local time, equivalent to (UTC+1) unless otherwise stated)



## **INTRODUCTION**

The Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) was notified of the occurrence by Arik Air Limited on 11 February, 2026. Investigators were dispatched to the site on the same day. Post-occurrence assessments commenced under the provisions of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 2023 and Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).

This Preliminary report details the initial facts, discussions and findings surrounding the occurrence. It includes information gathered from witness statements, flight recorders, ATC transcript and a preliminary inspection of the Aircraft.

This report presents the current status of the notification's processing. Its content may still change and does not necessarily bind the conclusions published in the investigation's Final Report.

**The investigation is ongoing.**



## 1.0 FACTUAL INFORMATION

### 1.1 History of the flight

On 11 February, 2026, a Boeing 737-700 aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-MJF, operated by Arik Air Limited was on a scheduled passenger flight from Murtala Muhammed International Airport (DNMM), Lagos, to Obafemi Jeremiah Awolowo International Airport (DNPO), Port Harcourt.

The captain stated that flight operations started at 05:30 h.

The captain further stated that the preflight preparations, flight crew briefing and passenger boarding, were normal.

At 07:10:59 h, Tower passed the following departure clearance to the Aircraft: "ARIK SEVEN FOUR ZERO CLEARED PORT HARCOURT UPPER ROMEO NINE EIGHT FOUR FLIGHT LEVEL TWO NINE ZERO SQUAWK ZERO FIVE ONE FOUR."

At 07:24 h, the aircraft was airborne as ARA740 on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan with seven (7) crew members and eighty (80) passengers on board and fuel endurance of 2 hours 40 minutes.

The First Officer was the Pilot Flying (PF), while the captain was the Pilot Monitoring (PM).

At 07:25:04 h, the lead cabin crew informed the flight crew via the interphone that they had heard a hissing sound from the L1 door (front passenger boarding door). The crew discussed the hissing sound report and attributed it to coming from the door seal, which would fizzle out in a short time.

At 07:27:52 h, the Radar/Approach control requested the crew to contact and continue with the Area Control Centre (ACC) on 127.3 MHz, and the crew acknowledged.

At 07:28:17 h, the ACC cleared the ARA740 to climb to FL 290 and fly direct to Port Harcourt.

The crew stated that at about 07:35 h, during climb, passing FL 260 for FL 290 in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC), a loud bang was heard, followed by severe vibration and an abnormal grinding noise from the engine.

The aircraft veered left and began decelerating while maintaining the climb attitude.



At this time, the autopilot was ON and engaged in Vertical Navigation (VNAV) and Lateral Navigation (LNAV) modes.

The crew immediately disconnected the autopilot and adjusted the aircraft's pitch attitude to stabilise and maintain control.

After assessing the engine parameters, the crew recognised that the aircraft had sustained severe damage to the No. 1 engine.

Thereafter, the crew reported carrying out (engine shut down) in accordance with Arik Airline's Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), followed by a Mayday call, informing the Air Traffic Control (ATC) of the nature of the emergency and the intention for an air return.

However, the ATC advised the crew to divert to Benin airport, as it was closer than Lagos.

The crew stated that they decided to divert to Benin Airport, as advised by ATC, due to its proximity and the uncertainty about the aircraft's flyability.

At 07:36:52 h, the first officer, who was the pilot flying at the time of the occurrence, transferred the control of the aircraft to the captain.

At 07:36: 57 h, the captain responded: "I HAVE CONTROLS".

At 07: 38:55 h, the ATC gave the vector heading to Benin, as requested by the crew: "FLY HEADING ZERO SIX FIVE, ZERO SIX FIVE TAKES YOU DIRECT TO BRAVO ECHO NOVEMBER".

At 07:39:21 h, the first officer informed the captain that Benin was just 40 miles away and that the aircraft needed to lose some altitude.

At 07:39:40 h, the lead cabin crew requested entry to the cockpit and was allowed by the captain.

The lead cabin crew was briefed by the first officer on the nature of the emergency (engine failure), the flight crew's intention (diversion to an alternate airport – Benin), the time available (14 minutes), and special instructions (door L1 would be used for disembarkation, except in the event of a fire).

The lead cabin crew, in turn, briefed the other cabin crew members, conducted a safety demonstration for the passengers, prepared the cabin for a precautionary landing, and



communicated the same to the flight crew.

At 07:43:13 h, ARA740 was cleared by the Lagos ACC to fly direct to Benin and to continue with Benin Control Tower on the frequency 122.5 MHz.

At 07:47:23 h, while passing FL 100 to FL 060, the crew contacted Benin Tower and provided its flight information.

At 07:47:58 h, Benin Tower cleared ARA740 to continue its descent to FL 060 and to expect no delay for the Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach Runway 23.

During post occurrence interview, the captain stated that, while approaching Benin at about 5000ft, the crew elected to perform an orbit to lose height and complete the final checklist items. Concerns about the aircraft's low-speed handling were expressed and the lead cabin crew was requested by the Captain to visually check the control surfaces for any damage.

At 08:03:23 h, the aircraft was 6 miles out and reported established on ILS Runway 23.


Benin Tower passed the following landing instructions to the aircraft "ARIK 740 EXERCISE CAUTION DUE BIRD ACTIVITIES, SURFACE WIND CALM, WITH THE RUNWAY IN SIGHT, CLEAR TO LAND RUNWAY 23 AND BE ADVISED FIRE WATCH ROOM AND AMBULANCE ARE ON STANDBY".

At 08:06:07 h, ARA740 landed safely on runway 23.

The crew stated that the touchdown was normal, thrust reverser number 2 was deployed, and the auto-braking setting of 3 units was used.

ARA740 stopped short of the runway end, backtracked, taxied and parked on the apron. All passengers disembarked normally without injuries.

The incident occurred in daylight and Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed.



**Figure 1:** ARA 740 Flight track from DNMM to DNBE

**1.2 Injuries to persons**

<b>Injuries</b>	<b>Crew</b>	<b>Passengers</b>	<b>Total in the Aircraft</b>	<b>Others</b>
<b>Fatal</b>	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
<b>Serious</b>	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
<b>Minor</b>	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
<b>None</b>	7	80	87	Nil
<b>TOTAL</b>	7	80	87	Nil

**1.3 Damage to aircraft**

The aircraft was substantially damaged.



## 1.4 Other damage

Nil

## 1.5 Personnel information

### 1.5.1 Captain

Nationality:	Nigerian
Age:	58
Licence type:	Airline Transport Pilot License (ATPL), Aeroplane
Licence:	Valid till 08 May 2030
Aircraft ratings:	BE-300, Dash-6 (Twin Otter), B737-300/500, Dash-8, BE-1900D, B737-NG
Medical certificate:	27 March 2026
Instrument rating:	06 November 2026
Total flying time:	+14,000:00 h
Total on type:	+80 h
Total on type (PIC):	+80 h
Last 90 days:	+80 h
Last 28 days:	+60 h
Last 7 days:	+10 h
Last 24 hours:	+3 h

### 1.5.2 First officer

Nationality:	Nigerian
Age:	33



5N-MJF

Licence type:	Airline Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL), Aeroplane
Licence:	Valid till 02 February 2030
Aircraft rating	Boeing 737-NG
Medical certificate:	09 JULY 2026
Instrument rating:	13 January 2027
Total flying time:	+3,600 h
Total on type:	+3,200 h
Last 90 days:	+173 h
Last 28 days:	+42 h
Last 7 days:	+13 h
Last 24 hours:	0

## **1.6 Aircraft information**

### **1.6.1 General information**

Type:	Boeing 737-700
Manufacturer:	The Boeing Aircraft Company, USA
Year of manufacture:	2007
Serial number:	34762
Registered operator:	Arik Air Limited
Registration marks:	5N-MJF
Certificate of Airworthiness:	Valid till 24 October 2026
Certificate of Insurance:	Valid till 12 April 2026
Certificate of Registration:	Issued on 14 December 2007



Noise certificate: Issued on 05 September 2013

Airframe time: 24110:48 h

Cycle since new (CSN): 29675

### 1.6.2 Engines

<b>Engine</b>	<b>Number 1</b>	<b>Number 2</b>
<b>Manufacturer</b>	CFM International, USA	CFM International, USA
<b>Type/Model</b>	CFM56-7B	CFM56-7B
<b>Serial number</b>	805612	896988
<b>Time since new</b>	24,110 h	22,322 h
<b>Cycle since new</b>	29,674	18,613

Fuel Used: Jet A1

As of 24 December, 2019, the incident engine ESN 805612 was installed on number 2 position on an aircraft with Romanian registration, YR-BMD, operated by Blue Air Aviation S.A. – CAMO.

On 04 November 2022, ESN 805612 was installed at the number 1 position on an aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-MJF, and the engine run was performed successfully.



**Figure 2:** Aircraft at its parking position on the Apron



## 1.7 Meteorological information

The meteorological conditions for DNBE were as follows:

<b>Time</b>	<b>06:00UTC</b>	<b>07:00UTC</b>	<b>08:00UTC</b>
<b>Wind:</b>	Calm	Calm	Calm
<b>Visibility:</b>	2600 m	2000 m	4000 m
<b>Weather:</b>	Broken	Broken	Haze
<b>Cloud:</b>	Few 270m	Few 300m	Few 300m
<b>Temp/Dew:</b>	24°C/23°C	25°C/24°C	27°C/24°C
<b>QNH:</b>	1013 hPa	1013 hPa	1014 hPa

## 1.8 Aids to navigation

The status of the navigational aids at DNBE on the day of the occurrence was as follows:

### NAVAIDS STATUS

116.5 MHz	"BEN" VOR/DME	-Unserviceable-
109.7MHz	"IBE" ILS/DME	-Serviceable-

## 1.9 Communication

There was effective communication between the ATC and the flight crew. The serviceability of the communication aids at Benin City Airport (DNBE), Benin Airport, on the day of the occurrence was as follows:

VHF 122.5 MHz	TOWER MAIN FREQ	-Serviceable-
VHF 121.7 MHz	DOMESTIC FREQ	-Serviceable-



VHF 121.5 MHz      EMERGENCY FREQ      -Serviceable-


### 1.10 Aerodrome information

Oba Akenzua II Airport, Benin City (DNBE), Edo State, has an Aerodrome Reference Point at 061859.5117N, 0053556.2021E and an elevation of 259.042ft (78.957m). The aerodrome has a runway with an orientation of 05/23. The length and width of the runway are 2,400 m (7874.016 ft) and 45 m (147.638 ft), respectively. The runway has an asphalt surface, a Precision Approach Lighting System (PALS), and a Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI). DNBE is equipped with ICAO Cat. 1 approach lights. The airport is rated CAT 6 for fire coverage capabilities.

### 1.11 Flight recorders

The Aircraft is fitted with a solid-state memory Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice Recorder.

<b>Recorders</b>	<b>Flight Data Recorder (FDR)</b>	<b>Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)</b>
<b>Manufacturer</b>	Honeywell	Honeywell
<b>Model</b>	SSFDR	SSCVR
<b>Part number</b>	980-4700-042	980-6022-001
<b>Serial number</b>	SSFDR-19247	CVR120-03745



**Figure 3:** FDR Plot showing engine vibration parameters

The recorders were retrieved by investigators at Benin City Airport. The data was downloaded successfully at the Transport Safety Laboratory (TSL), Abuja, on 13 February 2026.

### 1.12 Wreckage and impact information


The crew, climbing out through FL 260 to FL 290, heard a loud bang followed by excessive vibration from the left (number 1) engine. Post-occurrence inspection of the aircraft on the apron at Benin City airport revealed the following about the engine and the airframe:



1. Engine inlet cowling missing.
2. Number 6 fan blade of engine was broken with the root left attached.
3. The remaining 23 fan blades were all chipped off and damaged.
4. Inboard and outboard engine cowling covers were folded upward, exposing the engine accessories.
5. The engine-driven pump (EDP) clamp was found loose.
6. A deep cut about 0.6 inches long on the containment case was observed at the 2 o'clock position.
7. A long, deep cut about 7.2 inches on the containment case was observed at the 1 o'clock position.
8. Cracks were observed on the exterior of the engine case containment.
9. The Outlet Guide Vanes (OGV) at 5, 6, and 7 o'clock positions were missing.
10. The engine-driven pump sustained damage.
11. There was visible damage on the exhaust assembly.
12. The engine oil tank filler cap was missing.
13. The anti-ice duct was broken, and part of it was missing.
14. The left-hand vortex generator was damaged.
15. The Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) oil cooler was damaged.
16. There were dents and punctures at various locations on the airframe.
17. Damage to the inner and outer thrust reversers.
18. There were cuts on the Left wing leading edge.
19. The left-wing air conditioning bay fairing was damaged.
20. The left horizontal stabilizer leading edge was damaged.




21. The upper surface of the horizontal stabilizer was damaged, with large cuts.
22. The vertical stabilizer leading edge was damaged.
23. There was visible damage on the rudder surface




**Figure 4:** The damaged number 1 engine




**Figure 5:** Broken fan blade fragment lodged in the engine case containment



**Figure 6:** Crack on the external part of the containment case



**Figure 7:** Decoupled Engine-driven pump (EDP)




**Figure 8:** Loosed engine-driven pump (EDP) Clamp



**Figure 9:** Broken Anti-ice duct and missing Engine oil tank filler cap



**Figure 10:** Damaged Integrated Drive Generator (IDG) oil cooler and Outlet guide vanes (OGV) at 5, 6, and 7 o'clock position.



**Figure 11:** Crack on the external part of the containment case



**Figure 12:** Chipped fan blades



**Figure 13:** Missing Number 6 fan blade



**Figure 14:** Root of the fractured fan blade



**Figure 15:** Folded inboard and outboard engine cowlings



**Figure 16:** Deep cut on the left horizontal stabilizer leading edge



**Figure 17:** Damage to the inboard engine core cowling



**Figure 18:** Damage to the outboard engine cowling



**Figure 19:** Damaged left hand vortex generator



**Figure 20:** Tear on the lower section of the fuselage



**Figure 21:** Damaged vertical stabilizer leading edge



**Figure 22:** Damage to the rudder surface

### **1.13 Medical and pathological information**

The post-occurrence medical examination was conducted on the flight crew at the Kupa



Aerospace Clinic, MMA2, Lagos, on 11 February 2026. The crew tested negative for alcohol, drugs and other psychoactive substances.

### **1.14 Fire**

There was no fire

### **1.15 Survival aspect**

The occurrence was survivable, as there was a livable volume in the cockpit and cabin; the aircraft's fuselage integrity was not compromised. Also, the restraint systems, such as seatbelts and shoulder harnesses, were intact.

### **1.16 Test and research**

Nil

### **1.17 Organisational and management information**

#### **1.17.1 Arik Air Limited**

Arik Air Limited (AAL) is a private airline founded in 2006, headquartered in Lagos State, Nigeria. Its operating base is Murtala Muhammed International Airport. It serves major cities in Nigeria. Arik Air Limited holds an approved Air Operator Certificate (AOC) issued on 12 July 2024, Number: ARIK/AOC/07-10/01.



## 2.0 INITIAL FINDINGS

1. The flight crew were licensed to conduct the flight
2. The aircraft had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness.
3. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying while the Captain was the Pilot Monitoring.
4. While climbing through FL 260 to FL 270, the flight crew heard a loud bang and grinding noise, followed by vibrations from the No. 1 engine.
5. The crew declared MAYDAY, called ATC, and diverted to Benin City airport.
6. The No. 6 fan blade of number 1 engine was missing upon landing at Benin.
7. As of 24 December, 2019, the incident engine ESN 805612 was installed on number 2 position on an aircraft with Romanian registration, YR-BMD, operated by Blue Air Aviation S.A. – CAMO.
8. On 03 May, 2020 ESN 805612 was removed from YR-BMD in serviceable condition after a power assurance check, by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Ltd., BEDEK Aviation Group, a Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) organisation, and preserved after accomplishing the required tasks.
9. ESN 805612 is owned by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) Ltd., BEDEK Aviation Group, a Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) organisation, and leased to Arik Air Ltd.
10. On 24 May 2021, ESN 805612 was converted from 7B22/3 engine dash to 7B26/3 engine dash in accordance with CFM SB 72-0595R3. SB 72-0003R12 was also incorporated, and a Certificate of Release to Service (CRS) was duly issued.
11. On 26 August 2021, ESN 805612 was installed at the number 2 position on an aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N- MJN, at a Time Since New (TSN) of 15, 671:28 h and Cycle Since New (CSN) of 12, 652.
12. On 16 August 2022, ESN 805612 was removed from 5N -MJN/BXV at a Time Since New (TSN) of 15, 676:49 h and Cycle Since New (CSN) of 12, 653.
13. On 04 November 2022, ESN 805612 was installed at the number 1 position on an aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-MJF, and the engine run was performed successfully.
14. On 27 March, 2025, an engineering order was issued by Arik Air Ltd. to implement the following references: CFM 56-7B-SB-72-1033; FAA AD 2018-26-01 and EASA AD



2019-0018 No. B737 -004 -2018 R02 dated 15 October, 2020 on the subject: CFM 56-7B engines Fan blades – Dovetail repetitive Ultrasonic inspection.

15. The report of the Non- Destructive Test (NDT) inspection IAW SB72-1033 rev04 carried out by G2 Metric, France, on CFM 56 -7B serial number 805612 indicated that “No defect found on 24 blades inspected of the engine SN 805612. Authorised Release Certificate EASA FORM 1 was duly issued to that effect.
16. On 30 March, 2025, a maintenance entry in respect of the task carried out on the left FAN blade ultrasonic inspection IAW WO – 5N- MJF/FO1338 was recorded in the technical logbook and duly certified by a certifying engineer.

### **Further Investigative Actions**

1. Metallurgical examination of the missing number 6 engine fan blade root.
2. Metallurgical examination of the remaining 23 engine fan blades
3. Teardown/stripping of the number 1 engine