



FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

**CIVIL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT
ON ALOUETTE II S. A. 3180 NEAR
WARRI AERODROME on 12th JULY,
1976**

FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
PRINTING DIVISION, LAGOS

CIVIL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
REPORT ON ALOUETTE II S. A.
3180 NEAR WARRI AERODROME

Federal Ministry of Civil Aviation,
Air Registration Branch, Mortals
Mohammed Airport, P.M.B.
1029, Ikeja.

[Ref. No. CAD. 52/9/77171](#)
20th September, 1977.

The Honourable Commissioner for Civil Aviation,
Federal Ministry of Civil Aviation,
Lagos.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the Report by Mr K. K. O. Sagoe, an Inspector of Accidents, on the circumstances of the accident to Alouette 11 SN-AHO which occurred in a forest about 1.6 kilometres west of Warri Aerodrome on 12th July, 1976.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Yours Sincerely,

M. M. A. AGBABIAKA, *Chief*
Inspector of Accidents

CIVIL AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Aircraft.-S.A. 3180 Alouette 11 Serial No 1985.

Engine.-Turbomeca Astazou IIA Serial No. 853.

Registered owner.-National Electric Power Authority (Niger Dams Authority), P.M.B. 12605, Lagos.

Crew.-Captain Zsolt Baturfi, c/o Aero Contractors (Nig.) Limited, Ikeja-Injured. Passenger:

Mr Ogbeni, Manager, N.E.P.A.-Injured.

Place of Accident.-About 19 km. from Warri Airfield. Co-ordinates of the wreckage site were approximately 05.25N, 05.55E, on a bearing of 135, from the Warri "EW" NDB at an elevation of 36.6 metres above mean sea level. This is about 1.6 km. west of Umolo villaga in Utorugu (Warri), Bendel State. Ward airstrip is a private aerodrome owned and operated by Aero Contractors (Nigeria) Limited.

Date and Time.-12th of July, 1976 at 1402.*

Summary.-The Alouette 11 helicopter registration 5N-AHO was on private flight from Port Harcourt to Lagos with a proposed re-fuelling stop at Warri. About 12 nautical miles from Warri aerodrome the helicopter developed a left spin about its vertical axis which eventually ended in a crash into a thick vegetation 213.4 m. below.

I. INVESTIGATION

I.1. HISTORY OF THE FLIGHT

The helicopter was operating a non-scheduled flight from Port Harcourt to Lagos with a proposed re-fuelling stop at Ward. The estimated time of departure from Port Harcourt was 1305 local time, flying on visual flight rules in clear weather. The Captain, Zsolt Batorfi gave his estimated time of arrival in Warri as 1405. The last contact with Port Harcourt was at 1319 when the helicopter reported at the Control Zone Boundary-20 Nautical Miles.

Contact was made with the Warri Aero Contractors Radio Room at 1359.

The Pilot was making a descent from 34.8m approximately 10 minutes out from Warri when he heard a metallic sound and the helicopter immediately spun violently to the left losing height. The pilot made a frantic attempt to reduce the rate of fall by increasing the collective pitch of the main rotor blades.

The helicopter crashed in daylight at 1402.

I.2 METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

There was no established weather station at Warri aerodrome. A system of visual reporting was adopted by the airstrip operator. The estimated meteorological information was

Wind Gusty
Visibility 4 Kilometres or less
Weather Rain
Temperature 28°C.

I.3 INJURIES TO PERSONS

	Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others
Fatal				
Non-fatal	1	1 None

All times in this report are local.

1.8 COMMUNICATIONS

The Radio Station Licence No. 034/AC/76 was valid till the 31st of December, 1976. Aero Contractors maintained a Flight Information Service at Warri on V.H.F. 131.7 M.H.Z. and H.F. 5695 K.H.Z. The Helicopter contacted Warri on V.H.F. 131.7 at 1359 and reported abeam Ughelli with an E.T.A. Warri as 1410. The following was also transmitted "Passing through a stormy weather, operations normal". He failed to call again 5 minutes out to landing i.e. 8 kilometres out in accordance with Aero Contractors local Flight Procedure. Warri Radio alerted Port Harcourt at 1410.

1.9 SEARCH AND RESCUE

A search commenced from Warri in another helicopter 5N-AKD at 1430. The rescue party concentrated around the Ughelli area. As 5N-AKD was approaching the crash area, Captain Batorfi by then had positioned the E.L.T. which he activated from the highest position possible. He succeeded in getting two pen light flares. 5N-AKD reported sighting the wreckage

at 1532. By 1540 the Rescue Party was air-borne with the injured pilot and passenger for Eku hospital. Arrival time at the hospital was 1600.

1.10 WITNESSES

No eye-witnesses.

1.12 OBSERVATIONS IN THE COCKPIT AFTER CRASH

Fuel shut off lever wire-locked in the 'ON' position.

Generator ..	OFF.
Battery	OFF.
Booster pump ..	OFF
Communications	131.7 (on Warri Frequency).
ADF	138.7 Switched off.
Fire extinguisher	Discharged with Impact.
Gyro-Compass ..	Stuck on 322 degrees.
Q.F.E.	Set at 1013.5 with altimeter reading 900 ft.
Air Speed Indicator	Stuck on 140 knots.


er, 1976.
M.H.Z.
reported
Passing
landing
Radio

ie rescue
sh area,
position
wreckage
for Eku

000 ft.

UH

UH



WRECKAGE SKETCH

Point of impact
17 miles tip of tree.

General perspective
etc in flight
path

Blade tip
MR

in rubber plantation
approx 1/2 mi.

1.14. TESTS AND RESEARCH

The following components were shipped to the National Aerospace Laboratory, NLR, the Netherlands.

1. The tail rotor gear-box with the damaged tail rotor blades and the tail end of the
3. Splined Coupling-(Gear-box end of transmission). A complete failure analysis was carried out on these components until a conclusive evidence was pin-pointed as the possible primary cause of the accident.

2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

2.1. Analysis

The circumstances of the aircraft's departure from Port Harcourt and the enroute phase of the flight at cruising altitude were routine. The slight detour abeam Utorugu was considered standard manoeuvre in view of the prevailing weather conditions.

Approximately ten minutes out from Warri, the Pilot heard a metallic sound after which the helicopter immediately spun violently to the left and finally crashed 213.4m to the woods. The pilot made a frantic attempt to reduce the rate of fall by increasing the collective pitch of the main rotor blades. This procedure could have increased the rate of spin further and probably just marginally reduced the rate of fall.

From the wreckage six equally probable causes of the accident were discovered. These were :

1. Failure of the tail rotor control cables.
2. Failure of the tail rotor blade flapping stop.
3. Failure of the drive shaft just aft of the front coupling.
4. Internal failure of the tail rotor gear-box.
5. Failure of one of the drive shaft bearings.

A detailed laboratory investigation was carried out. The findings at the National Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands revealed that the probable cause of the tail rotor malfunction was the failure of the tail rotor gear-box input coupling. This resulted from excessive fretting wear on the splines on the input drive shaft and the internal splines of the coupling ring.

The time since overhaul of the tail-rotor gear-box at the time of crash was 1315.5 hours.

2.2. CONCLUSIONS (a) *Findings*

1. The helicopter had a valid certificate of airworthiness.
2. The helicopter was well maintained at all times before the accident.
3. The Pilot of the helicopter was qualified to be in command.
4. The flight was conducted in accordance with the approved flight manual.
5. All laws and Regulations were observed in the operation of the helicopter.
6. The search and rescue operations were conducted to commendable standards.


(b) Cause

7. The helicopter crashed due to mechanical failure.


2.3. RECOMMENDATION

The time between overhaul of the tail-rotor gear-box should be limited to 1200 hours until strip reports could justify the 1500 hour time between overhaul which is now permitted.

K. K. O. SAGOF,
Inspector of Accidents



View of the ring-gear (which probably failed)



Tail-rotor gear-box showing position of the ring gear relative to the tail-rotor float stops



Crash scene showing the wreckage