

Preliminary Report on the Accident involving an Embraer ERJ 170-100LR Aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-ENR operated by Enugu Air Limited, which occurred at Oba Akenzua II Airport, Benin, Edo State on 23 July 2026

Operator:	Enugu Air Limited
Type and model:	Embraer ERJ 170-100 LR
Manufacturer:	Embraer S.A., Brazil
Year of manufacture:	2009
Nationality and registration marks:	5N-ENR
Serial number:	17000274
Location:	Runway 05, Oba Akenzua II Airport, Benin (Coordinates 06°19'00"N 005°35'56"E)
Date and Time:	23 July 2026 at about 14:55 h

(All times in this report are local time (UTC+1) unless otherwise stated).



INTRODUCTION

Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) investigators were present at Oba Akenzua II Airport, Benin, when the accident occurred and responded immediately. Post-occurrence assessments commenced under the provisions of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 2026 and Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

This Preliminary Report details the initial facts and findings surrounding the occurrence. It includes information gathered from witness statements, flight recorders, ATC transcript and a preliminary inspection of the aircraft.

This report presents the current status of the notification processing. Its content may still change and does not necessarily bind the conclusions published in the investigation's final report.

In accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the sole objective of this investigation is the prevention of accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of the investigation to apportion blame or liability.

The investigation is ongoing.



1.0 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the flight

On 23 July 2026 at 14:00 h, an Embraer ERJ 170-100LR aircraft with nationality and registration marks 5N-ENR, operated by Enugu Air Limited as scheduled passenger flight ENU4264, departed Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos (DNMM) for Oba Akenzua II Airport, Benin (DNBE) on an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan. Onboard were five crew members and 63 passengers, with a fuel endurance of 2 hours 10 minutes.

The First Officer was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the Captain was the Pilot Monitoring (PM).

At 14:19 h, the aircraft was airborne from Runway 18L.

The take-off, climb, cruise and descent phases of the flight were reported to be normal.

At about 14:27 h, while still in contact with Lagos ATC, the aircraft established two-way communication with Benin Tower.

At 14:28:05 h ATC cleared ENU4264 as follows: "FIVE NOVEMBER ECHO NOVEMBER ROMEO IS CLEARED TO BENIN FLIGHT LEVEL TWO ONE ZERO NO DELAY EXPECTED FOR ILS APPROACH RUNWAY TWO THREE CONTACT TIME ONE THREE TWO FIVE BENIN MET REPORT AT THIRTEEN HUNDRED UTC SURFACE WIND TWO FOUR ZERO AT ZERO NINER KNOT VISIBILITY THREE THOUSAND METERS IN LIGHT RAIN BROKEN CLOUD TWO SEVEN ZERO METERS FEW CHARLIE BRAVO SIX HUNDRED METERS DIRECTION WEST TO EAST OF THE FIELD QNH ONE ZERO ONE FOUR TEMPERATURE TWO SEVEN DEGREES CHARLIE DEW POINT TWO FOUR DEGREES CHARLIE BE ADVISED IT HAS STOPPED RAINING OVER HEAD THE STATION AND VISIBILITY IS ABOUT FOUR THOUSAND METERS".

At 14:28:50 h, the crew acknowledged the clearance and requested RNAV approach to Runway 05 instead, which was approved.



At 14:34 h, the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) recordings showed that the flight crew conducted an approach briefing and associated approach and landing procedures while monitoring weather conditions at Benin. During the arrival, the flight crew expressed concern about the presence of rain in the vicinity of the airport.

At 14:36:29 h, Lagos ATC released the aircraft to Benin Tower.

At 14:42 h, Benin Tower advised the crew that the approach path to Runway 05 appeared cloudy and that the approach path to Runway 23 appeared better. The crew acknowledged and elected to continue the RNAV approach to Runway 05.

At 14:48 h, the CVR recorded the DATCO advising the crew that visibility was about 1,500 m in moderate rain.

During the approach, Benin Tower continued to provide updated information on rainfall, visibility, and surface wind.

At 14:53:08 h, the CVR recordings showed that flaps 5 was called for and at 14:53:18 h, flaps 5 was set.

At 14:53:24 h, ATC passed a landing clearance as "FIVE NOVEMBER ECHO NOVEMBER ROMEO SURFACE WIND IS ONE EIGHT ZERO ZERO EIGHT KNOT EXERCISE CAUTION ON LANDING RUNWAY SURFACE WET WITH THE RUNWAY IN SIGHT CLEARED TO LAND RUNWAY ZERO FIVE". The crew acknowledged and continued the approach.

During the approach briefing, the First Officer stated that the autobrake system was not working and that manual braking would be used for landing. The crew also cross-checked an approximate landing weight of 32,000 kg.

The CVR showed that the crew continued the approach after acquiring visual reference, with recorded crew coordination and approach call-outs.

At 14:54:49 h, the FDR information indicated that the aircraft touched down at about 1,641.5 m from the threshold of Runway 05 at a recorded groundspeed of about 138.2 kt.



At 14:54:52 h, the CVR recorded the Captain calling “max reversal”.

At 14:54:58 h, the CVR recorded flight crew vocalisations, followed by a loud noise and landing-gear aural warnings. After coming to a stop at about 325 m from the end of Runway 05, the flight crew informed Benin Tower that the aircraft had overshoot the runway and was at the far end. ATC acknowledged and advised that fire vehicles were on the way. The Duty Air Traffic Controller activated the airport emergency response and notified the Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (ARFFS) and relevant airport and ATC agencies.

All occupants were evacuated unhurt via the emergency escape slide through the rear left door (L2).

The accident occurred at 14:55 h, in daylight and Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) prevailed.




Figure 1: DNMM – DNBE Flight track



1.2 Injuries to persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Total in the Aircraft	Others
Fatal	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Serious	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Minor	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
None	5	63	68	Nil
TOTAL	5	63	68	Nil

1.3 Damage to aircraft

The aircraft was substantially damaged.

1.4 Other damage

Seven approach lights were damaged during the runway excursion. The investigation is assessing whether damage occurred to other aerodrome or navigational aid infrastructure.

1.5 Personnel information

1.5.1 Captain

Nationality:	Nigerian
Age:	41 years
Licence type:	Airline Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL), Aeroplane
Licence:	Valid until 25 September 2027
Aircraft ratings:	EMB 170/190, B737-NG, ATR42/72, C-310, B727-200,

**DASH-8 Q400**

Medical certificate:	Valid until 06 March 2027
Instrument rating:	Valid until 30 May 2027
Proficiency check:	Valid until 29 November 2026
Total flying time:	7,093:23 h
Total on type:	86:15 h
Total on type (PIC):	86:15 h
Last 90 days:	86:15 h
Last 28 days:	86:15 h
Last 7 days:	29:15 h
Last 24 hours:	5+ h

1.5.2 First officer

Nationality:	Nigerian
Age:	35 years
Licence type:	Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL), Aeroplane
Licence:	Valid until 16 December 2030
Aircraft rating:	EMB 135/145, EMB170/190-E1
Medical certificate:	Valid until 09 December 2026
Instrument rating:	Valid until 24 March 2027
Proficiency check:	Valid until 24 September 2026



Total flying time:	2,373:20 h
Total on type:	863 h
Total on type (PIC):	Not Applicable
Last 90 days:	263 h
Last 28 days:	93:25 h
Last 7 days:	29:40 h
Last 24 hours:	Nil

1.5.3 Purser

Nationality:	Nigerian
Age:	32 years
Licence type:	Cabin Crew Licence
Licence:	Valid until 23 January 2027
Aircraft ratings:	B737-300/500, B777-200/300, EMB 175/190, EMB 190/195E, EMB 135/145
Medical certificate:	Valid until 12 November 2026

1.5.4 Flight Dispatcher

Nationality:	Nigerian
Age:	33 years
Licence type:	Flight Dispatcher Licence
Licence:	Valid until 09 November 2030
Recurrency:	Valid until 23 October 2026



Competency:

Valid until 06 November 2026

1.6 Aircraft information

1.6.1 General information

Type: Embraer ERJ 170-100 LR

Manufacturer: Embraer S.A., Brazil

Year of manufacture: 2009

Serial number: 17000274

Registered operator: Enugu Air Limited

Registration marks: 5N-ENR

Certificate of Airworthiness: Valid until 08 December 2026

Certificate of Insurance: Valid until 26 September 2026

Certificate of Registration: Issued on 01 April 2026

Noise certificate: Issued on 21 February 2025

Airframe time: 23,227:28 h

1.6.2 Engines

Engine	Number 1	Number 2
Manufacturer	General Electric (GE), USA	General Electric (GE), USA
Type/Model	CF34-8E5	CF34-8E5
Serial number	193596	193485
Time since new	19650:51	20080:50
Cycles since new	20889	21317

Fuel Used: Jet A1



Figure 2: Aircraft Final Resting Point

1.7 Meteorological information

Meteorological reports for DNBE provided by the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) were as follows:

TIME (UTC)	1300	1400	1500
Wind:	240°/09 kt	240°/10 kt	240°/05 kt
Visibility:	3000 m	1000 m	4000 m
Weather:	-RA	+RA	-RA
Cloud:	BKN 270 m FEW CB 600 m	BKN 240 m FEW CB 540 m	BKN 270 m FEW CB 540 m
Temp/Dew:	27°C/24°C	25°C/24°C	25°C/25°C
QNH:	1014 hPa	1013 hPa	1013 hPa



The Air Traffic Control (ATC) Watch Log recorded a SPECI issued at 1337 UTC with visibility of 1,600 m in moderate rain and broken cloud at 240 m. The Air Traffic Operations Manager (ATOM) report stated that the 1300 UTC METAR was the only meteorological report provided to the DATCO up to the time of the occurrence.

The ATC communications reviewed by the investigation did not contain transmission of a Runway Condition Report (RCR) or Runway Condition Code (RWYCC) to the flight crew.

1.8 Aids to navigation

The status of the navigational aids at DNBE on the day of the occurrence was as follows:

116.5 MHz	"BEN" VOR/DME	-	Unserviceable
109.7 MHz	"IBE" ILS/DME	-	Serviceable
Aerodrome Beacon		-	Unserviceable
Weather Display System		-	Unserviceable

An uncompleted building structure located beyond the end of Runway 05 (Runway 23 threshold end) obstructs the control tower's line of sight to that part of the aerodrome (Figure 3).



Figure 3: The incomplete building obstructing the line-of-sight to the end of Runway 05 (Runway 23 threshold end)

1.9 Communication

Two-way radio communication was maintained between Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the aircraft. The serviceability of the communication aids at DNBE on the day of the occurrence was as follows:

VHF 122.5 MHz	TOWER MAIN FREQ	Serviceable
VHF 121.7 MHz	DOMESTIC FREQ	Serviceable
VHF 121.5 MHz	EMERGENCY FREQ	Serviceable



1.10 Aerodrome information

Oba Akenzua II Airport, Benin City (DNBE), Edo State, has an Aerodrome Reference Point at 06°19'00"N, 005°35'56"E and an elevation of 259.042 ft (78.957 m). The aerodrome has a runway oriented 05/23. The length and width of the runway are 2,400 m (7,874.016 ft) and 45 m (147.638 ft), respectively. The runway has an asphalt surface, a Precision Approach Lighting System (PALS), and a Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI). DNBE is equipped with ICAO Cat. 1 approach lights. The airport is rated CAT 6 for fire coverage capabilities.

The published declared distances for Runway 05 were as follows: Take-off Run Available (TORA): 2,400 m; Take-off Distance Available (TODA): 2,400 m; Accelerate-Stop Distance Available (ASDA): 2,400 m; Landing Distance Available (LDA): 2,400 m.

1.11 Flight recorders

The aircraft was fitted with two solid-state Digital Voice and Data Recorders (DVDRs), with the following particulars:

Recorders	Digital Voice and Data Recorders (DVDR)	Digital Voice and Data Recorders (DVDR)
Manufacturer	Honeywell, USA	Honeywell, USA
Model	DVDR	DVDR
Part number	980-6025-001	980-6025-001
Serial number	DVDR-02317	DVDR-02262

The FDR and CVR were downloaded and read out at the NSIB Transportation Safety Laboratory, Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja, on 27 July 2026, and the recorded data were successfully correlated with the occurrence flight.




Figure 4: FDR-derived flight-data display covering the recorded flight segment




Figure 5: Altitude profile through landing



The FDR data were processed using the applicable Frame Format Descriptor (FFD) conversion algorithms supplied by Embraer S.A., Brazil. The data were converted to engineering units for review of flight-path, speed, vertical-speed, throttle and braking parameters. The recording was confirmed to correspond to the occurrence flight.

Because the recorder parameters are sampled asynchronously, values for CAS, FMS target CAS, flap position, throttle and VSI shown at specific gates represent the nearest valid recorded sample to the applicable gate. They should not be interpreted as having been recorded at exactly the same instant.

The recorded parameters are set out in the table below.

Reference point	RA (ft)	Pressure altitude (ft)	CAS (kt)	FMS target CAS (kt)	Groundspeed (kt)	VSI (ft/min)	Flap (deg)	Throttle L (deg)
1,000 ft AGL	1004.6	1098.0	145.2	137.0	166.7	-896.0	20.0	27.9
500 ft AGL	499.8	658.5	141.2	137.0	157.5	-512.0	20.0	34.1
90 ft AGL	93.5	344.0	143.0	139.0	154.1	-32.0	20.0	40.6
Touchdown	-0.2	262.0	130.2	139.0	138.2	480.0	—	21.7
+5 s after touchdown	1.4	271.0	112.2	139.0	120.9	-80.0	20.0	1.2
+10 s after touchdown	0.8	269.0	101.5	139.0	105.1	—	—	3.0
+15 s after touchdown	4.9	268.0	87.8	139.0	89.2	—	20.0	5.1
+18 s after touchdown	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—



Touchdown is identified in the source FDR data at approximately 97,828.0 seconds. At this point, the recorded radio altitude was approximately 0 ft, pressure altitude was approximately 262 ft, groundspeed was approximately 138.2 kt, and calibrated airspeed (CAS) was approximately 130.2 kt. The FMS target CAS was approximately 139 kt. The recorded flap setting remained at 20°, while the left throttle-lever channel indicated approximately 21.7°.

The aircraft's recorded groundspeed at touchdown was therefore approximately 138 kt.

Based on the NSIB flight animation, 5N-ENR appears to have crossed the threshold of Runway 05 at a recorded radio altitude of about 93.5 ft and subsequently touched down at about 1,641.5 m from the runway threshold.

The wind components derived from the recorded wind observations indicate a tailwind during the approach and landing:

At the runway threshold: wind 204° at 13.3 kt, corresponding to approximately 12.0 kt tailwind and 5.8 kt right crosswind for Runway 05.

At touchdown: wind 187° at 8.8 kt, corresponding to approximately 6.4 kt tailwind and 6.0 kt right crosswind for Runway 05.

Recorded groundspeed decreased from approximately 138 kt at touchdown to approximately 105 kt after 10 seconds and approximately 79 kt at about 18 seconds. Brake-pressure channels showed an increase after touchdown, with individual recorded pressures reaching several hundred psi. The highest values identified in the analysed portion were approximately 615 psi on the right-hand inboard channel, 568 psi on the left-hand inboard channel and 459 psi on the left-hand outboard channel.

The ground-spoiler channels indicate activation.



1.12 Wreckage and impact information

The aircraft landed at about 1,641.5 m from the threshold of Runway 05, traversed the runway-end blast pad and entered the unpaved area beyond the runway. The aircraft then struck the approach-lighting installations and impacted two fixed concrete structures of a decommissioned localizer installation, located beyond the runway end.

After the aircraft impacted the concrete structure, the landing-gear assemblies broke and separated from the aircraft. Field evidence indicated that the nose landing gear separated first, followed by the right main landing gear and then the left main landing gear.

During the subsequent ground excursion, both engines contacted the ground, leaving about 87.0 m of right-engine and about 82.6 m of left-engine ground-drag marks leading towards the aircraft's final resting position beyond the runway end.

The following damage was observed:

1. The Nose Landing Gear, Right Main Landing Gear and Left Main Landing Gear detached from the aircraft.
2. Detached fragment of the Right engine cowling
3. The horizontal stabilizer was ruptured.
4. The forward lower fuselage skin was abraded.
5. The left wing aileron and flaps were ruptured.
6. The right wing aileron and flaps were ruptured.

The aircraft came to rest at about 325 m from the end of Runway 05 (Figure 7).



Figure 6: An overlay of the recorded flight path on Google Earth



5N-ENR WRECKAGE DISTRIBUTION DIAGRAM

BENIN AIRPORT
ELEVATION: 236 ft RUNWAY 05
LATITUDE: 6.326568
LONGITUDE: 5.609343




Figure 7: Ground track and wreckage distribution diagram

Note: The runway length annotated on this diagram reflects a field measurement. The published declared distances for Runway 05, used throughout this report, are 2,400 m (See Section 1.10).



Figure 8: Separated nose wheel tyre



Figure 9: Separated nose landing gear assembly



Figure 10: Separated right main landing gear assembly



Figure 11: Separated left main landing gear assembly



Figure 123: Detached fragment of the Right engine cowling



Figure 13: Deployed L2 exit slide used for evacuation



Figure 14: Ruptured horizontal stabilizer



Figure 15: Ruptured forward lower fuselage skin



Figure 16: Close-up of the ruptured forward lower fuselage skin.



Figure 17: A view of the decommissioned localizer installation concrete structure



Figure 18: Broken approach lights



Figure 19: Right engine ground drag marks



Figure 20: The ruptured left wing aileron and flaps



Figure 21: The ruptured right wing aileron and flaps



Figure 22: Deployed right engine thrust reverser



Figure 23: Deployed Ram Air Turbine (RAT)



1.13 Medical and pathological information

Post-occurrence medical examinations, including toxicology tests, were conducted on the flight crew at 107 Air Maritime Group (AMG) Medical Group, Benin, on 23 July 2026 and at Kupa Aerospace Clinic, MMA2, Lagos, on 24 July 2026. The crew tested negative for alcohol, drugs and other psychoactive substances.

1.14 Fire

There was no fire.

1.15 Survival aspects

The occurrence was survivable. The fuselage was intact, and survivable occupant space was retained in both the cockpit and the cabin. The occupant restraint systems, including seat belts and shoulder harnesses, remained intact. There was no post-impact fire. All 63 passengers and five crew members evacuated the aircraft using the emergency escape slide from exit L2, and all 68 occupants were accounted for without injury.

The Aerodrome Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (ARFFS) was on bad-weather standby during the landing and responded following the runway excursion.

1.16 Tests and research

Nil.



1.17 Organisational and management information

1.17.1 Enugu Air Limited

Enugu Air Limited (EAL) is a public-private partnership airline founded in 2025, headquartered in Enugu, Enugu State, Nigeria. Its operating base is at the Akanu Ibiam International Airport. It serves major cities in Nigeria. Enugu Air Limited holds an approved Air Operator Certificate (AOC) issued on 10 March 2026, Number: EAL/AOC/03-26/001. It operated a fleet of two Embraer 170 and four Embraer 190.

1.18 Additional information

Nil



2.0 INITIAL FINDINGS

1. The flight crew were licensed and qualified to conduct the flight.
2. The aircraft had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness.
3. The First Officer was the Pilot Flying and the Captain was the Pilot Monitoring.
4. The take-off, climb, cruise and descent phases of the flight were normal.
5. The aircraft overran the end of Runway 05.
6. All occupants evacuated without injury, and there was no post-impact fire.
7. Weather deteriorated during the aircraft's arrival, with moderate rain and reduced visibility reported before landing.
8. ATC advised the crew that the approach path to Runway 23 appeared better than the approach path to Runway 05; the crew acknowledged and continued the RNAV approach to Runway 05.
9. ATC, while issuing the landing clearance, also advised the crew that the runway surface was wet.
10. The ATC communication given during the landing clearance to the crew did not include Runway Condition Report/Runway Condition Code (RCR/RWYCC).
11. During the approach briefing, the crew stated that the autobrake system was not working and that manual braking would be used for landing.
12. FDR data recorded a tailwind component during the final approach and landing.
13. The aircraft crossed the Runway 05 threshold at a recorded radio altitude of about 93.5 ft.
14. The aircraft landed at about 1,641.5 m from the threshold of Runway 05.



15. FDR information showed that increased brake pressure and ground-spoiler activation were recorded following touchdown.
16. Post-occurrence examination of the wreckage found the thrust-reverser assemblies in a deployed condition.
17. The aircraft struck the approach-lighting installations and impacted two fixed concrete structures of a decommissioned localizer installation, located beyond the runway end.
18. The aircraft impacted the concrete structure, the landing-gear assemblies broke and separated from the aircraft. Field evidence indicated that the nose landing gear separated first, followed by the right main landing gear and then the left main landing gear.
19. The weather information display equipment provided for operational use at Benin tower was unserviceable at the time of the occurrence.
20. An uncompleted building structure is obstructing the controller's line of sight towards the end of Runway 05 (Runway 23 threshold end).



3.0 IMMEDIATE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 Safety Recommendation A-2026-039

The Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) should ensure that the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) remove the fixed structures of the decommissioned localizer installation located at the end of Runway 05 at Oba Akenzua II Airport, Benin.

3.2 Safety Recommendation A-2026-040

The Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) should ensure that the Control Tower is positioned to provide unrestricted view of all the movement areas of the aerodrome.

3.3 Safety Recommendation A-2026-041

The Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) should provide a suitable control tower location for the Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) to ensure unrestricted view of all the movement areas of the aerodrome.

3.4 Safety Recommendation A-2026-042

The Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) should restore and maintain the serviceability of the weather information display equipment provided for operational use at Oba Akenzua II Airport, Benin control tower, and ensure that current meteorological information is reliably available to Air Traffic Services for timely dissemination to flight crews.



4.0 FURTHER INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS

1. Assessment of runway condition, Global Reporting Format (GRF)/RCR implementation and the collection, dissemination and use of meteorological and runway-condition information.
2. Further examination of the wreckage, landing gear collapse and separation mechanisms, ground marks, impact sequence and relevant runway-end and aerodrome infrastructure.
3. Review of flight crew training, experience, operational decision-making and applicable Enugu Air Limited procedures.