

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE SERIOUS INCIDENT INVOLVING A CHALLENGER 601-3A AIRCRAFT WITH NATIONALITY AND REGISTRATION MARKS N989BC OPERATED BY VMO AERO LIMITED, WHICH OCCURRED NEAR ASABA AIRPORT (DNAS), DELTA STATE, NIGERIA, ON 10 JUNE, 2026

Operator:	VMO Aero Limited
Type and model:	Challenger 601-3A
Manufacturer:	Bombardier Inc., Canada
Year of manufacture:	1988
Nationality and registration marks:	N989BC
Serial number:	5021
Location:	Road under construction in the vicinity of Asaba Airport (DNAS), Asaba, Delta State.
Date and Time:	10 June 2026 at 08:57 h <i>(All times in this report are local times equivalent to UTC+1 unless otherwise stated).</i>



INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau (NSIB) was notified of the occurrence on 10 June 2026 by the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria (FAAN). Investigators were dispatched and commenced post-occurrence assessments in accordance with a safety investigation under the provisions of the Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations 2026 and Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO).

This Preliminary Report aims to provide details of the initial facts gathered thus far. These include discussions and findings regarding the occurrence, information gathered from witness accounts, post-occurrence inspection of the aircraft, documents received, and other evidence obtained to date.

The information contained herein is preliminary in nature and subject to change as additional evidence becomes available. It does not necessarily bind or determine the conclusions to be published in the investigation's Final Report.

No analysis of the occurrence or determination of causes or contributing factors should be inferred from the factual information presented in this Preliminary Report.

The investigation is ongoing.



1.0 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of the flight

On 10 June 2026, Bombardier Challenger CL601-3A, registration N989BC, operated by VMO Aero Limited, was scheduled to conduct an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight from Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos (DNMM) to Asaba Airport (DNAS), Delta State, Nigeria. There were seven persons on board, comprising the Pilot-in-Command (PIC), Second-in-Command (SIC), an Observer Pilot, one cabin crew member and three passengers.

The PIC was designated as the Pilot Flying (PF) for the flight, while the SIC performed the duties of Pilot Monitoring (PM). During the interview, the PIC stated that he had joined the operator approximately ten days before the occurrence and that this was his first flight into Asaba Airport. The SIC stated that he had recently joined the operator on a contractual basis.

Before departure, the flight crew prepared the aircraft for the planned flight to Asaba. Both flight crew members stated that the RNAV Approach was planned.¹ Runway 11 was available within the aircraft's Flight Management System (FMS) navigation database and was programmed before departure. According to the PIC, the crew anticipated that Runway 11 would be the active runway and expected to receive either an Instrument Landing System (ILS) or RNAV Approach Clearance depending on Air Traffic Control (ATC) instructions.

The Observer Pilot reported that during the preparation of the aircraft, he observed what he believed were discrepancies in the programming of the Flight Management System and brought them to the attention of the flight crew. According to the Observer Pilot, the PIC advised him that, as he was not rated on the aircraft type and was travelling solely in an observational capacity, he should not interfere with the aircraft preparation. Both the PIC

¹ RNAV Approach is an instrument Approach that uses satellite navigation instead of Ground-based radio equipment like a Localizer or VOR. RNAV stands for Area Navigation. It means the aircraft can navigate to any point in space using GPS (Ground Positioning System) rather than following a radio beam from a specific transmitter on the ground. <https://simtuts.com/guides/rnav-gps-approach-guide-msfs>



and SIC acknowledged that discrepancies were encountered during FMS programming before departure and stated that the entries were subsequently corrected.

The cabin crew stated that she had requested the standard Pre-Flight Briefing before departure. During the Briefing, the PIC reportedly advised that the planned Cruising Level would be Flight Level (FL) 290. According to the cabin crew, the Observer Pilot challenged the selected Cruising Level and stated it should be FL190, leading to a disagreement between the PIC and the Observer Pilot before departure. The cabin crew stated that she subsequently informed company management of the discussion before Take-off.

At about 08:01 h, N989BC departed Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos (DNMM) for Asaba Airport (DNAS) under IFR according to the operational records of the ATC at DNMM. The flight crew reported that the Departure, Climb, and cruise Phases were uneventful. At about 08:31 h N989BC established communication with Asaba Tower on frequency 118.5 MHz. Asaba Tower acknowledged the aircraft, advised that Runway 11 was in use and instructed the flight crew to expect the RNAV Runway 11 via VIVKA.² The controller also passed the current aerodrome pressure setting (QNH 1014 hPa).

At about 08:32 h, Asaba Tower transmitted the following meteorological information: SURFACE WIND 180° AT 3 KNOTS, VISIBILITY 10 KILOMETRES, NO SIGNIFICANT WEATHER, BROKEN CLOUD AT 300M, QNH 1014 HPA, TEMPERATURE 27°C AND DEW POINT 25°C. The flight crew acknowledged receipt of the weather information.

According to both flight crew members, intermittent cloud was encountered during the Initial Approach. The PIC estimated the cloud base at approximately 300 to 400 feet and stated that visual reference to the runway environment was intermittent. He further stated that the aircraft's navigation indications continued to show alignment with the published RNAV Approach, while the runway environment appeared visually displaced to the right of the aircraft's track. Rather than continuing the Approach, the PIC requested a right 360-degree manoeuvre from Asaba Tower, which was approved. The aircraft was instructed to report completion of the orbit.

² VIVKA is a Waypoint. A **waypoint** is a specified geographical location used to define an area navigation route or the flight path of an aircraft employing area navigation. <https://skybrary.aero/articles/waypoint>



At about 08:44 h, Asaba Tower issued a Landing Clearance for Runway 11 and advised the surface wind as 180° at 4 knots. Shortly afterwards, the Asaba Tower Controller instructed the aircraft to climb to 3,000 feet and report overhead XUTKO³ consistent with the aircraft discontinuing the Initial Approach.

The SIC provided a similar account, stating that the PIC initially reported the runway in sight before visual reference was lost due to cloud. According to the SIC, the aircraft climbed back to approximately 3,000 feet and repositioned to approximately 12 nautical miles from the airport to conduct another Approach.

At about 08:45 h, Asaba Tower requested the reason for the Missed Approach and instructed the aircraft to report its position. The Asaba Tower Controller subsequently instructed the aircraft to report AMVED⁴. No explanation for the go-around is available in the NAMA records. At about 08:46 h, Tower again instructed the aircraft to report AMVED.

According to the transcript obtained from Asaba ATC, between 08:50 h and 08:51 h, Asaba Tower made repeated requests for the aircraft's position, but the aircraft did not respond.

The flight crew stated that the RNAV Approach Runway 11 was re-established within the Flight Management System following the repositioning manoeuvre. The aircraft proceeded inbound on the published Approach and the navigation indications continued to show the aircraft had aligned with the Approach Path. The PIC reported that the paved surface ahead appeared consistent with the expected runway environment and aligned with the aircraft's navigation guidance.

The SIC stated that the aircraft reported approximately 6 to 7 nautical miles from the runway before receiving Landing Clearance from Asaba Tower, and that the PIC subsequently reported the runway in sight. The aircraft's navigation indications continued to show the aircraft was established on the published RNAV Approach Runway 11.

At about 08:55, Asaba Tower cleared N989BC to land on Runway 11 and reported the surface wind as 180° at 3 knots.

³ XUTKO is a Waypoint

⁴ AMVED is a Waypoint



During subsequent clarification interviews, both flight crew members stated that Asaba Airport and the RNAV Runway 11 procedure were contained within the aircraft's navigation database and that the aircraft's navigation indications displayed the aircraft on the correct Approach Path throughout the Final Approach.

The PIC and SIC further stated that, during the final stages of the Approach, the Observer Pilot identified the paved surface ahead as the runway. According to both flight crew members, the PIC questioned whether the surface ahead was the intended runway before the Observer Pilot confirmed that it was.

The Observer Pilot provided a different account of the Approach. He stated that the aircraft remained in cloud until late in the Approach, that the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) generated repeated "TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP" alerts, and he observed that there was a telecommunications mast ahead of the aircraft, and instructed the PIC to discontinue the Approach and climb immediately the cabin crew stated that, during the Approach, one of the passengers became concerned after overhearing discussions between the pilots and asked whether one of the pilots was undergoing training. The passenger was informed that all three pilots on board were experienced captains. The cabin crew reported no abnormal cabin events before Touchdown.

At about 08:57 h, the aircraft touched down on an under-construction paved roadway near the Asaba Airport.

According to the PIC, upon Touchdown and during the Landing Roll, the flight crew initially believed that the paved surface was part of runway 11 extension until after the aircraft came to a stop near parked construction equipment. At this time, the flight crew recognised that the aircraft had landed on a roadway under construction.

The Observer Pilot reported looking through the Captain's side window, realised that the aircraft had landed on a roadway rather than Runway 11, and instructed the PIC to apply maximum braking as the aircraft approached the end of the paved portion of the roadway.



The cabin crew stated that, after the aircraft had come to a stop, it became apparent to those on board that the aircraft had landed at a location other than the intended runway.

At about 08:58 h to 09:02, Asaba Tower made repeated attempts to establish communication with N989BC: "N989BC ASABA TOWER," "N989BC ASABA TOWER, HOW DO YOU READ?" No substantive response from the aircraft was recorded during this period.

At about 09:05 h, communication was re-established between N989BC and Asaba Tower. The Asaba Tower Controller requested confirmation that the aircraft had landed on a "wrong pavement." At about 09:14 h, the flight crew advised the Tower that the aircraft had landed on "a road under construction on the other side of the runway." The Controller instructed the aircraft to stand by.

At about 09:16 h, Asaba Tower asked the flight crew to confirm whether they intended to "take off on the road." The aircraft replied in the affirmative, following which the controller again instructed the aircraft to stand by. The PIC stated that after shutting down the aircraft, an external inspection of the aircraft and the surrounding area was carried out. The PIC inspected the aircraft structure, landing gear, tyres, and the condition of the paved surface and found no obvious damage. Based on the inspection, the PIC considered the aircraft serviceable. The SIC also exited the aircraft and inspected both the aircraft and the surrounding area.

The cabin crew stated that, after the aircraft came to a stop, the principal passenger requested an explanation for the occurrence. The passengers were subsequently briefed by the PIC, and they disembarked the aircraft before it departed the roadway.

The PIC stated that while the aircraft remained on the roadway, the company management, including the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), was informed of the condition of the aircraft and its occupants, as well as the plans for the return flight. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the company confirmed that the cabin crew first notified the management of the occurrence shortly after the aircraft landed on the roadway. The management instructed the flight crew to assess the condition of the aircraft, maintain communication with Asaba

Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the relevant airport authorities, confirm the welfare of all persons on board and continue providing operational updates to the company.

The CEO further stated that the flight crew subsequently advised they had concerns about the security of their location and were uncomfortable remaining at the occurrence site while awaiting further assistance.

The operator further stated that company management maintained communication with the flight crew while the company's internal occurrence reporting and response procedures were initiated.

The PIC stated that while the aircraft remained on the roadway, an unidentified individual handed the PIC a telephone. The caller claimed to be the Asaba Airport Manager and asked whether the aircraft could be moved safely. The PIC told the caller that the flight crew had inspected both the aircraft and the paved surface and considered them suitable for departure.

Operational reports obtained from the Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) indicate that, following notification of the occurrence, the Airport Manager, Airspace Manager, Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (ARFFS), Aviation Security, Airport Company representatives, the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), Lagos Area Control Centre and Benin Area Control Centre were notified.

According to the Asaba Duty Air Traffic Controller's report, at about 09:32, the rescue team advised Asaba Tower that they had reached the reported location of the aircraft. The report states that the aircraft appeared undamaged and that the passengers were no longer present at the site.

In contrast, the PIC and SIC stated during interviews that no airport rescue or emergency response personnel physically reached the aircraft before it departed the roadway. From about 09:20 h to 09:52 h, Asaba Tower continued to make repeated attempts to establish communication with N989BC. The reconstructed transcript records numerous calls requesting the aircraft to respond or report its status. Several of these transmissions are

not followed by recorded responses. NAMA subsequently advised the investigation that the Asaba Tower voice recording system was unserviceable during the occurrence period and that the available communications transcript had therefore been reconstructed from operational records. Consequently, the investigation has been unable to determine whether any additional communications occurred that were not captured in the reconstructed record.

The SIC stated that, after completion of the external inspection, the flight crew assessed the available paved surface for departure. According to the SIC, the aircraft had come to rest near the end of the roadway. The persons present assisted with a manual pushback to reposition the aircraft and allow enough space for the engines to be started. The aircraft was turned approximately 180 degrees on the roadway. The SIC further stated that a vehicle subsequently drove the length of the roadway ahead of the aircraft to confirm that the departure path was clear of vehicles, persons and foreign object debris. The PIC similarly stated that he inspected the roadway before deciding whether departure could be safely attempted and that he would not have attempted the take-off had he considered the roadway unsafe.

At about 10:21 h, N989BC again established communication with Asaba Tower. At about 10:22 h, the flight crew requested START UP approval and Clearance to Lagos. At about 10:23 h, the Asaba Tower Controller confirmed Flight Level 260, QNH 1015 and START UP approval.

The PIC stated that, following these communications, the flight crew understood that they could prepare the aircraft for departure. From about 10:32 h to 10:57 h, Asaba Tower continued to make repeated calls to N989BC, including requests for Radio Checks and Position Reports. According to NAMA's reconstructed communications record, several of these Asaba Tower transmissions to the aircraft were not followed by flight crew response.

According to the clarification interviews of the flight crew, the aircraft departed from the roadway at about 11:00 h

At about 11:01 h, Asaba Tower instructed the aircraft to report airborne and advised the surface wind as 240° at 3 knots. At about 11:03 h, N989BC reported airborne. The aircraft



was subsequently cleared to Lagos via Route L433, Flight Level 260, with transponder code 0545. The flight crew acknowledged the Clearance, after which Asaba Tower requested the aircraft's estimated arrival time and the number of persons on board.

At about 11:04 h, Asaba Tower requested the aircraft's endurance. After the information was provided, the Controller instructed the aircraft to continue the Climb to Flight Level 260 and report two-way communication with Benin Area Control on 122.5 MHz. At about 11:06 h, N989BC reported that two-way communication had been established with Benin Area Control and continued the flight to Lagos without further reported occurrence.

NAMA operational records indicate that both Benin Area Control and Lagos Area Control were advised of the occurrence and the aircraft's return flight. According to those records, the aircraft landed at Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos (DNMM) at about 11:42 h.

Both flight crew members stated that the return flight to Lagos was completed without further operational abnormalities.

Following arrival in Lagos, the aircraft underwent an external inspection. The PIC stated that damage was subsequently identified to the left nose-wheel assembly.

1.2 Injuries to persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Total in the aircraft	Others
Fatal	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Serious	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Minor	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
None	4	3	7	Nil
Total	4	3	7	Nil



1.3 Damage to aircraft

Undetermined

1.4 Other damage

Nil

1.5 Personnel Information

1.5.1 Pilot-In-Command (PIC)

Nationality:	Canadian
Age:	75 years
Licence type:	FAA Airline Transport Pilot Licence (Airplane) Airplane - Single/Multi engine CL-600, CL-604, HS-125, LR-JET
Medical certificate:	Valid till 30 June 2026
Instrument rating:	Valid till 21 May 2027
Proficiency check:	21 May 2026
Total flying time:	16,305 h
Total on type:	6,748 h
Total on type (PIC):	6,748 h
Last 90 days:	10 h
Last 28 days:	10 h
Last 7 days:	10 h
Last 24 hours:	Nil

1.5.2 Second-In-Command (SIC)

Nationality:	Nigerian
Age:	69 years
Licence type:	FAA Airline Transport Pilot Licence (Airplane) Airplane - Single/Multi engine CL-600, CL-604, HS-125, LR-JET



Medical certificate:	Issued 21 May 2026
Instrument rating:	Not yet Available
Proficiency check:	Not yet Available
Total flying time:	Not yet Available
Total on type:	Not yet Available
Total on type (PIC):	Not yet Available
Last 90 days:	Not yet Available
Last 28 days:	10 h
Last 7 days:	2 h
Last 24 hours:	2 h

1.5.3 Observer Pilot

Nationality:	Nigerian
Age:	58 years
Licence type:	FAA Airline Transport Pilot Licence (Airplane) Airplane - Single/Multi engine CL-604, EMB-145, HS-125

NOTE: The operational status and authority of the Observer Pilot in relation to the occurrence flight remain undefined.

1.5.4 Cabin Crew

Nationality:	Nigerian
Age:	26 years
Licence type:	Cabin crew
Licence validity:	Valid till 23 October 2027
Aircraft ratings:	CL-604/605



1.6 Aircraft information

1.6.1 General information

Type:	Challenger 601-3A
Manufacturer:	Bombardier Inc., Canada
Date of manufacture:	1988
Serial number:	5021
Registered operator:	VMO Aero Limited
Nationality and registration mark:	N989BC
Certificate of Airworthiness:	Issued 21 June 1988
Certificate of Registration:	Issued 5 February 2026
Certificate of Insurance:	Valid till 1 September 2026
Noise Certification:	FAR 36 Stage 3
Total Airframe Time:	10,552:5 h
Cycle Since New:	7,135

1.6.2 Engines

Engine	Number 1	Number 2
Engine model	CF34-3A	CF34-3A
Manufacturer	GE Aerospace, USA	GE Aerospace, USA
Year of manufacture	1988	1988
Serial number	350269	350284
Time Since New (TSN)	10,158:6 h	10,377:6 h
Cycle Since New (CSN)	7,092	7,084
Time Since Overhaul (TSO)	4,348:3 h	4,361:3 h

Fuel type used: Jet A-1



1.7 Meteorological information

The meteorological conditions for DNAS were as follows:

TIME	07:00 UTC	08:00 UTC	09:00 UTC	10:00 UTC
Wind:	000°/00 kt	180°/03 kt	210°/03 kt	240°/03 kt
Visibility:	07 km	10 km	10 km	10 km
Weather:	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil
Cloud:	SCT010	BKN010	BKN011	BKN011
Temp/Dew:	26°C/25°C	27°C/25°C	29°C/25°C	30°C/25°C
QNH:	1014 hPa	1014 hPa	1015 hPa	1014 hPa

1.8 Aids to navigation

The recorded status of the navigational aid at DNAS on the day of the occurrence was as follows:

112.6 MHz "SAB" VOR/DME	- Serviceable
108.3 MHz LOC "IAS"	- Serviceable
334.10 MHz Glide Scope	- Unserviceable
Aerodrome Beacon	- Serviceable
Wind Velocity Indicator	- Unserviceable
Airfield Lighting Control Panel	- Unserviceable

1.9 Communication

Two-way radio communication was established and maintained between the flight crew and Air Traffic Control units throughout most of the occurrence sequence.



The recorded status of the communication equipment at DNAS on the day of the occurrence was as follows:

118.5 MHz Tower Main Frequency	- Serviceable
121.7 MHz Domestic Frequency	- Unserviceable
121.5 MHz Emergency Frequency	- Unserviceable

NAMA informed the investigation that the Asaba Tower voice-recording system was unserviceable during the period of the occurrence. The Air Traffic Control communications record relied upon in this report has been reconstructed from NAMA operational records, rather than from a verbatim audio recording of communications between the aircraft and Asaba Tower.

1.10 Aerodrome information

Asaba Airport, with ICAO designator DNAS and IATA code ABB, is located approximately 7.9 km east of Asaba city centre in Delta State, with an Aerodrome Reference Point at 06°12'15" N, 006°39'55" E and an elevation of 305 ft (93 m) above mean sea level.

The aerodrome has a single bi-directional runway designated 11/29, measuring 3,400 x 45 m (11,155 x 148 ft). The Takeoff Run Available (TORA) is 3,400 m in both directions.

Runway 11 is equipped with a Category I Instrument Landing System (ILS) comprising a Glideslope, Localizer, and a VOR co-located with DME. A Category I runway lighting system is installed on Runway 11, consisting of Approach Lights, Runway Edge Lights, Runway Centerline Lights, Runway Threshold Lights, and Taxiway Lights. Precision Approach Path Indicators (PAPI) are installed on both sides of Runway 11.

The airport is rated Category 6 for fire and rescue coverage.

Road construction works were in progress in the vicinity of the aerodrome at the time of the occurrence.

1.11 Flight recorders

The aircraft was fitted with a magnetic tape Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR), with the following particulars:



Recorder	CVR	FDR
Model	Magnetic Tape	Magnetic Tape
Part number	93-A100-83	650-1-14040-004
Serial number	58767	EA4116
Manufacturer	Fairchild	Plessey/Lockheed

The recorders were retrieved and downloaded at the Bureau's Transport Safety Laboratory (TSL) in Abuja on 13 June, 2026. The data recovered to date has not yielded sufficient usable information to support a detailed reconstruction of the occurrence. Further technical examination is continuing.

1.12 Wreckage and impact information

The aircraft landed on a paved roadway under construction near Asaba Airport, without structural failure or fire. Following an external inspection at the site, the flight crew reported the aircraft serviceable, and it subsequently returned to Lagos. The operator's aircraft engineer also stated that, following the aircraft's return to Lagos, a post-flight inspection was conducted, and the damage to the No. 1 nose-wheel assembly was recorded in the Aircraft Technical Log.



Figure 1: Damage to the left nose-wheel assembly identified during post-flight inspection.



1.13 Medical and pathological information

Toxicological tests were conducted on the crew at an approved Aerospace Clinic in Lagos. Results were negative for alcohol, drugs and other psychoactive substances.

1.14 Fire

There was no fire.

1.15 Survival aspects.

The occurrence was survivable, as there was a liveable volume in the cockpit and cabin; the aircraft's fuselage integrity was not compromised. Also, the restraint systems, such as seat belts and shoulder harnesses, were intact. All seven occupants of the aircraft evacuated without injury.

1.16 Test and research

Nil.

1.17 Organisational and management information

VMO Aero Limited was established in 2022 with an operational Base in Ikeja, Lagos State, Nigeria. It holds a Permit for Non-Commercial Flight (PNCF) issued by the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) with permit number NCAA/ATR66/NCF143. The permit is valid until 29 October 2027. The PNCF authorises the operation of an aircraft only for non-commercial purposes and does not authorise the carriage of passenger(s), cargo, or mail for hire or reward.

The operator's fleet comprises one Challenger 601-3A, one Gulfstream G-IV, and two Hawker 800XP aircraft.



2.0 INITIAL FINDINGS

The following initial findings are based solely on the evidence available at the time of this Preliminary Report's publication. They should not be interpreted as indicating the causes or contributing factors associated with the occurrence.

Flight Preparation and Crew

1. The flight was conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) from Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos, to the intended destination, Asaba Airport, but landed on a paved under-construction roadway outside the perimeter fence of Asaba Airport.
2. There were seven persons on board comprising four crew members and three passengers.
3. The Pilot-in-Command (PIC) was the Pilot Flying (PF), and the Second-in-Command (SIC) was the Pilot Monitoring (PM).
4. The PIC reported that the occurrence flight was his first flight into Asaba Airport.
5. The flight crew reported that the RNAV Runway 11 procedure was available in the aircraft Flight Management System (FMS) navigation database and was programmed before departure.
6. The Observer Pilot reported observing discrepancies during the FMS programming before departure.
7. The flight crew reported that discrepancies encountered during FMS programming before departure were corrected before take-off.

Flight Operations

8. N989BC established communication with Asaba Tower before commencing the arrival.
9. The aircraft was instructed to expect, and was subsequently cleared to conduct, the RNAV Approach Runway 11.



10. During the Initial Approach into Asaba Airport, the flight crew requested a right orbit, which Air Traffic Control approved.
11. The aircraft discontinued the Initial Approach, carried out a Missed Approach and repositioned for a second Approach.
12. The aircraft was cleared to land on Runway 11.
13. The flight crew reported that the aircraft navigation indications displayed the aircraft established on the published RNAV Runway 11 approach during the second approach.
14. The PIC and SIC reported that the Observer Pilot identified the paved surface ahead as the runway.
15. The Observer Pilot provided a different account of the Second Approach from that of the flight crew.
16. The aircraft landed on a paved roadway under construction located in the vicinity of Asaba Airport
17. No injuries were sustained by any of the occupants.

Post-Occurrence

18. Following the landing, the PIC carried out an external inspection of the aircraft.
19. The passengers disembarked before the aircraft departed the roadway.
20. The PIC reported communicating with company management while the aircraft remained on the roadway.
21. The PIC reported communicating with an individual introduced as the Airport Manager while the aircraft remained on the roadway.
22. The aircraft subsequently departed directly from the roadway and returned to Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos.
23. A post-flight examination identified damage to the left nose-wheel assembly.

Air Traffic Services

24. Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) operational records indicate that the Asaba Airport Manager, Airspace Manager, Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Service, Rescue Team, Aviation Security, Airport Company representatives, Nigeria Civil



Aviation Authority (NCAA), Lagos Area Control Centre and Benin Area Control Centre were notified following the occurrence.

25. NAMA operational records indicate that the rescue team subsequently reported reaching the occurrence site.
26. The PIC and SIC reported that no airport rescue or emergency response personnel physically reached the aircraft before it departed the roadway.
27. NAMA reported that the Asaba Tower voice recording system was unserviceable during the occurrence.
28. The available Air Traffic Control communications transcript was reconstructed from the NAMA operational records.



3.0 IMMEDIATE SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 Safety Recommendation 2026-003

The Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), in coordination with the Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) and the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), should develop, promulgate and implement national procedures governing the management of aircraft involved in accidents and serious incidents that have landed or come to rest outside the intended runway, taxiway or manoeuvring area of a certificated aerodrome.

The procedures should clearly define:

- a. the responsibilities of the aircraft operator, Pilot-in-Command, Air Traffic Services, aerodrome operator, regulatory authority and accident investigation authority following such occurrences;
- b. the conditions under which an aircraft may be moved following an accident or serious incident;
- c. the requirement for immediate notification and coordination with the Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau following reportable occurrences;
- d. the requirement for an appropriate technical assessment of the aircraft by suitably qualified personnel before any aircraft involved in an accident or serious incident is permitted to move or undertake any subsequent flight;
- e. the requirement to secure and preserve the occurrence site and associated evidence pending completion of the necessary investigative activities, except where movement is necessary to protect life, prevent fire or remove an immediate hazard; and
- f. the requirement for formal coordination between the aircraft operator, Air Traffic Services, the aerodrome operator, the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority and the Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau before any movement of the aircraft, except where necessary to protect life or remove an immediate hazard.



Safety Issue

This investigation established that the aircraft landed on a roadway under construction instead of the intended runway, remained at the occurrence site for approximately two hours and subsequently departed directly from the roadway. The occurrence highlights the need for nationally harmonised procedures governing post-occurrence aircraft management, inter-agency coordination, technical assessment and preservation of evidence following accidents and serious incidents.

3.2 Safety Recommendation 2026-004

The Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN) should review and strengthen aerodrome emergency response procedures to ensure that aircraft involved in accidents or serious incidents occurring on or in the vicinity of certificated aerodromes are promptly attended to and managed by appropriate emergency and operational personnel, and that occurrence sites are secured and documented. Evidence is preserved pending the arrival and coordination of the Nigerian Safety Investigation Bureau, except where immediate action is required to protect life or remove an immediate hazard.

Safety Issue

The occurrence highlighted the importance of effective emergency response, occurrence site management, inter-agency coordination and preservation of evidence following reportable aviation occurrences.

3.3 Safety Recommendation 2026-005

The Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) should review the availability, reliability, maintenance and redundancy of Air Traffic Services voice recording systems at controlled aerodromes to ensure that communications associated with accidents and serious incidents



are continuously recorded, protected and available to support accident and incident investigations.

Safety Issue

Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA) reported that the Asaba Tower voice recording system was unserviceable during the period of the occurrence. Consequently, the available communications record had to be reconstructed from operational records, thereby limiting the availability of recorded communications relevant to the investigation.

Further Investigation

The continuing investigation will include, but will not be limited to, the following activities:

1. Detailed examination of the aircraft, including the damage sustained during the occurrence and its significance to the aircraft's operation before, during and after the landing on the roadway.
2. Further technical examination of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) to determine whether additional usable information can be recovered.
3. Examination of the aircraft's navigation systems, avionics configuration and Flight Management System (FMS), including verification of the navigation database, approach selection, aircraft guidance indications and system performance throughout the flight.
4. Review of the operator's operational procedures, operational control arrangements, flight preparation procedures, crew assignment processes, Crew Resource Management (CRM) practices and Emergency Response Plan (ERP), including management actions following notification of the occurrence.
5. Detailed examination of all communications between the flight crew, company management, Air Traffic Services, airport authorities and other organisations following the landing and before the aircraft departed the occurrence site.
6. Review of the aerodrome environment, including the road construction project, obstacle assessments, safeguarding measures, temporary works, visual cues

available to flight crews, published aeronautical information and associated risk mitigation measures.

7. Examination of Air Traffic Services actions, communications, coordination and decision-making following notification of the occurrence.
8. Review of the airport emergency response, including notification timelines, deployment of emergency services, scene management, preservation of evidence and coordination between all responding organisations.
9. Completion of outstanding interviews and evaluation of additional information requested from the operator, the Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), the Nigerian Airspace Management Agency (NAMA), the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA), the Nigerian Meteorological Agency (NiMet) and other relevant organisations.
10. Review of the applicable regulatory framework governing the movement of aircraft following an accident or serious incident.